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Abstract
We find that motivated monitoring by institutional investors mitigates firm
investment inefficiency, estimated by Richardson’s (2006) approach. This relation
is robust when using the annual reconstitution of the Russell indexes as exogenous
shocks to institutional ownership during the period 1995–2015 and after classifying
institutional ownership by institution type. We also show that closer monitoring
mitigates the problem of both over-investing free cash flows and under-investment
due to managers’ career concerns. Finally, we document that the effectiveness of
the monitoring by institutional investors appears to increase monotonically with
respect to the firm’s relative importance in their portfolios.
Keywords: Institutional investors; Investment efficiency; Monitoring attention; Agency
problem; Index switch
JEL classification: G23; G30; G31; M4
∗We would like to thank the journal editor John Doukas, the two anonymous referees, Seth Armitage,
Chris Brooks, Rong Ding, Lynn Hodgkinson, Mohammad Irani, Scott Richardson, Alessio Ruzza, Ben
Sila, Lei Zhao, and seminar participants at the ICMA Centre, 2017 FEBS annual conference, 2017
EFMA annual conference, 2017 World Finance conference, 2017 AAA annual conference, and 2017
FMA annual conference for their insightful and constructive comments. The financial support from
Durham University Business School and ICMA Centre is gratefully acknowledged.
†Corresponding author: Associate Professor, Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane,
Durham, DH1 3LB, United Kingdom. Tel. +44(0)1913345095. E-mail addresses: yeqin.zeng@durham
.ac.uk (Y.Zeng), c.ward@icmacentre.ac.uk (C. Wards), chao.yin@icmacentre.ac.uk (C. Yin).
This article has been accepted for publication and undergone full peer review but has not 
been through the copyediting, typesetting, pagination and proofreading process, which may 
lead to differences between this version and the Version of Record. Please cite this article as 
doi:10.1111/eufm.12232












Successful investment by companies creates shareholder value and drives firm growth.
However, firms may fail to invest efficiently due to conflicts of interest between managers
and shareholders. Several managerial agency problems have been identified as leading
to either over-investment (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997;
Richardson, 2006) or under-investment (e.g., Porter, 1991; Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2003; Aghion et al., 2013). As less efficient investment is associated with lower firm
future stock performance (Titman et al., 2004; Cai and Zhang, 2011), understanding
the governance of firm investment efficiency in publicly traded companies is of great
importance to firms’ shareholders.
In this paper, we examine the role of motivated monitoring by institutional investors
in improving corporate investment efficiency. Given the trade-off between the costs and
benefits of active monitoring, institutional investors will not have the same incentive
to monitor the activities of every firm in their portfolios. First, institutional investors
are not homogeneous: their monitoring roles are related to institution type, their in-
vestment horizon, and their preference for trading (Bushee, 1998; Chen et al., 2007;
Schmidt and Fahlenbrach, 2017). Second, it is not optimal for institutional investors to
equally monitor all the firms held in their portfolios, because their capacity to monitor
is not unlimited (Kempf et al., 2017);1 the motivation of institutional monitoring would
rationally depend on the relative importance of an individual stock in their portfolios
(Fich et al., 2015). Previous studies have focused on the heterogeneity of institutional
investors, and how their institutional characteristics might affect firm performance. In
contrast, we follow Fich et al. (2015) and focus on the variety of monitoring attention
that would be expected within institutions on firms held in their portfolios, and how
this divergence can affect managerial decision making.
When economic agents have a limited capacity for processing information, it is rational
for them to vary the attention they give to different sources of information when making
decisions (Sims, 2003). Based on the assumption of limited attention, Kacperczyk et al.
(2016) develop an attention allocation model to predict optimal information choices for
mutual funds. Kempf et al. (2017) find that an institutional investor’s monitoring at-
tention to the firms it holds may become distracted if an exogenous shock affects the
stock returns of unrelated firms in its portfolio. Fich et al. (2015) posit that when an
1In practice, it is costly for investors to collect firm-specific information, analyze the information
with professional expertise, monitor firm activities, and intervene through shareholder activism.











institution has only limited monitoring attention, a greater proportion of its portfolio
that is represented by a firm will be associated with greater benefits of monitoring that
firm. They use the relative importance of a firm in institutional investors’ portfolios as a
proxy for the motivation of institutional monitoring in mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
and find that targets with more motivated monitoring institutional ownership (IO) have
higher deal premiums and deal completion probabilities.2 Motivated by these studies,
we measure an institutional investor’s motivation to monitor a firm by the fraction of
the institution’s portfolio represented by the firm. If the optimal level of monitoring
attention is determined by the trade-off between monitoring benefits and costs, an in-
stitutional investor will be more motivated to monitor firms which are relatively more
important in its portfolio.3 We extend Fich et al.’s (2015) study to firms’ general in-
vestment decisions and compare institutional investors with the highest motivation to
monitor with those that potentially have the least motivation to monitor.
Using a large U.S. sample for the period 1995–2015, we measure inefficient investment
as the abnormal investment estimated by Richardson’s (2006) investment model. Firm
over-investment (under-investment) is reflected in a positive (negative) regression resid-
ual. In addition to Richardson’s (2006) single panel regression, we estimate inefficient
investment in year t by a historical panel regression from 1981 to year t. The histor-
ical panel regression method avoids using unknown future information to predict the
current optimal level of investment.4 Our measure of institutional investors’ monitoring
motivation follows Fich et al. (2015). We sort all stocks into ten decile groups by their
holding value weighting within each institutional portfolio. Institutional investors have
the highest (least) motivation to monitor firms in the decile 1 (10) groups including
stocks with the top (bottom) 10% holding rankings.5 This motivation measure can also
be taken as the intensity of institution monitoring, given that the monitoring attention
of institutional investors is limited.
To test the relation between IO and firm inefficient investment, we must address the
potential endogeneity concern. Firms with higher or lower IO may differ in terms of
2Motivated monitoring institutional ownership is the ownership of institutional investors with high
motivation to monitor the firm. Masulis and Mobbs (2014) also find that directors who have multiple
directorships are motivated to monitor firms in which their directorships are relatively more prestigious.
3The opportunity costs of monitoring may not be ignored in the trade-off given the limited investors’
attention.
4All our measures of inefficient investment are negatively associated with cumulative excess stock
returns over the following year, suggesting that reducing investment inefficiency is beneficial to share-
holders.
5In our robustness tests, we extend our study to all ten decile groups and find that institutional
investors are motivated to monitor the firms in the top 3 decile groups.











unobservable characteristics. Therefore, comparing the investment efficiency of firms
with higher and lower IO may simply capture the effect of the unobservable differences
rather than the effect of institutional investor monitoring. Furthermore, institutional
investors may know firms in their portfolios well, and choose to invest more in firms
with higher investment efficiency and better corporate governance. We mitigate the
endogeneity due to the omitted variables and reverse causality using the instrumental
variables (IV) based on the Russell index annual reconstitution. When firms switch
between the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes, are included in the Russell 2000 index for the
first time, or leave the Russell 2000 index, there are exogenous changes in institutional
holdings (e.g., Chang et al., 2015; Fich et al., 2015; Crane et al., 2016; Schmidt and
Fahlenbrach, 2017). We estimate the relation between motivated monitoring IO and
firm inefficient investment with a standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation
framework, in a manner similar to that of Fich et al. (2015) and Schmidt and Fahlenbrach
(2017).
Our analyses yield three key findings. First, firms with greater motivated monitoring
IO appear to make more efficient investment decisions: their new investment deviates
less from predicted levels. Both under- and over-investment are negatively related to
motivated monitoring IO, suggesting that firms with more institutional investor mon-
itoring attention tend to invest more efficiently. The monitoring role of motivated in-
stitutions is economically important. A one standard deviation increase in motivated
monitoring IO leads to a $22.8 million reduction in annual under-investment and a
$60.1 million reduction in annual over-investment for the average sample-size firm with
$2,648.1 million in total assets.6 Second, the effect of the least motivated monitoring
IO on firm under-investment is positive and statistically significant, whilst the effect on
firm over-investment is statistically insignificant. This result supports our view that the
effectiveness of institutional monitoring is influenced by the relative importance of the
monitored firms within the institutional portfolios. Institutional investors do not have
the same motivation to monitor all holding firms. We further show that the motivation
of institutional investors to monitor a firm’s investment increases monotonically with the
weighting of the firm’s market value in their portfolios. Third, we reveal the channels
through which motivated monitoring by institutional investors improves investment ef-
ficiency. Motivated monitoring by institutional investors mitigates the over-investment
problem in firms with more cash reserves or free cash flows and mitigates the under-
6The marginal effect numbers reported here are based on the inefficient investment estimated by the
historical panel regressions.











investment problem by reducing the career concerns of firm managers.
Our paper contributes to the literature in four ways. First, we contribute to a growing
body of research that studies the relation between the monitoring attention of insti-
tutional investors and corporate decision making. Liu et al. (2016) and Kempf et al.
(2017) find that the monitoring attention of institutional investors to one firm can be
distracted by large shocks to the other firms in their portfolios. Fich et al. (2015)
study motivated monitoring by institutional investors in the context of M&As and find
that M&A targets with greater motivated monitoring IO receive better bidding prices.
Consistent with these studies, our results support the limited attention hypothesis that
institutional investors do not evenly distribute their monitoring attention amongst all
firms in their portfolios. Our paper is directly related to Fich et al. (2015). However,
since M&A targets usually have a relatively small firm size and they are not the firms
that actually make investment decisions, the benefits of motivated monitoring by insti-
tutional investors documented by Fich et al. (2015) may not be readily generalizable to
the investment efficiency of an average firm in the market. By examining firm general
investment inefficiency in a large panel sample, we further document that institutional
investors’ monitoring attention to a firm monotonically decreases when the relative im-
portance of the firm’s stock decreases in their portfolios. Based on this finding, we
construct a general monitoring motivation weighted IO measure. We show that firms
with greater monitoring motivation weighted IO make more efficient investments.
Second, our paper adds to the studies examining the factors that affect corporate in-
vestment, such as free cash flow (Jensen, 1986; Richardson, 2006), earnings management
(McNichols and Stubben, 2008), the quality of financial reporting (Biddle et al., 2009;
Cheng et al., 2013; Balakrishnan et al., 2014), management forecast ability (Goodman
et al., 2013), product market competition (Gu, 2016; Stoughton et al., 2017), policy
uncertainty (Gulen and Ion, 2016), accounting conservatism (Lara et al., 2016), mutual
fund flow (Lou and Wang, 2016), and changes in generally accepted accounting princi-
ples (Shroff, 2017). Our paper identifies motivated monitoring IO as a new factor that
can mitigate both firm over- and under-investment.
Third, our results shed light on the debate regarding which institutions are more likely
to monitor corporate activities. Previous studies have found that institutional investors
are heterogeneous and only a subset plays an active role in corporate governance (e.g.,
Brickley et al., 1988; Bushee, 1998; Chen et al., 2007; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009;
Fich et al., 2015). Recently, Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017) find that exogenous in-
creases in passive IO weaken firm corporate governance and reduce subsequent firm










2 HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS
performance, while Appel et al. (2016b) document that passive mutual funds influence
firms’ governance choices by means of their large voting blocs and improve firms’ long-
term performance. In our paper, we find that motivated monitoring by all types of
institutional investors, regardless of whether investors are active or passive, mitigates
firm inefficient investment, supporting the view that passive institutional investors pay
attention to important firms in their portfolios.
Finally, our paper complements two working papers on institutional investors and cor-
porate investment. Mullins (2014) finds that firms’ index fund ownership rises after they
are newly included in the Russell 1000 index. The increase of index fund ownership in
such firms leads to lower capital expenditures and less diversifying acquisition activities.
On the contrary, Wong and Yi (2015) find that institutional investors induce Russell 2000
firms to invest more and increase their investment sensitivity to changes in investment
opportunities. Our paper differs from these two studies in the following aspects. First,
we emphasize the incentive of institutions in monitoring corporate investment decisions,
while these two studies examine either index fund ownership or total IO. Second, we
investigate firm investment inefficiency and examine both over- and under-investment in
our analyses, whereas Mullins (2014) and Wong and Yi (2015) study the level of invest-
ment. Third, we find that the negative relation between motivated monitoring IO and
firm inefficient investment remains robust for different types of institutional investors.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses. Section
3 describes data sources and variable definitions. Section 4 presents our main test
results and addresses endogeneity. Section 5 discusses how motivated monitoring by
institutional investors can reduce inefficient investment and provides robustness test
results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Hypotheses and empirical predictions
In a perfect, frictionless capital market (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), firms make their
financing and investment decisions independently. The neoclassical theory of investment
predicts that a firm’s growth opportunity, commonly measured by Tobin’s Q, is the only
determinant of its investment policy (Hayashi, 1982; Abel, 1983). Given this ideal frame-
work, the optimal level of investment is achieved when the new investment’s marginal
benefit is equal to the sum of its marginal cost and the adjustment cost of capital. How-
ever, actual firm investment usually deviates from the optimal level due to frictions in
the capital market such as managerial optimism or pessimism, information asymmetry,
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conflict of interests between managers and shareholders, and external financing costs
(e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Biddle et al., 2009; Aghion et al., 2013; Asker et al.,
2015).
Previous studies have suggested that greater inefficient investment is associated with
lower subsequent firm performance (e.g., Titman et al., 2004; Cai and Zhang, 2011).
Therefore, firm shareholders have a strong incentive to monitor managers’ investment
decisions. Institutional investors are usually more active and effective than individual
investors in these monitoring activities, as shareholder activism is costly and it is difficult
for individual investors to intervene collectively. Indeed, the attention of institutional
investors is limited, and they may not allocate their monitoring attention equally to all
the stocks in their portfolios (Kempf et al., 2017). The motivation for institutions to
engage in monitoring is positively related to the benefits of monitoring and negatively
related to the cost of monitoring. Fich et al. (2015) find that the institutional investors
in M&A targets have a greater incentive to monitor deal transactions when the target
stocks are more important relative to the other stocks in their portfolios. Following Fich
et al. (2015), we conjecture that institutional investors have the most (least) motivation
to monitor firms whose holding value weights rank among the top (bottom) 10% of
the stocks in the investors’ portfolios. Intuitively, the rank of a stock’s weight in an
institutional investor’s portfolio is positively related to the benefit of monitoring. Given
limited attention, even if the actual costs of monitoring are equal for all firms in the
portfolio, the opportunity cost of monitoring is highest for firms in the bottom 10% of
the portfolio. When institutional investors monitor the firms in the bottom 10% of their
portfolios, the relatively more important firms may receive less effective monitoring. The
above discussion leads to our first hypothesis:
• H1: Motivated monitoring by institutional investors is positively associated with
investment efficiency.
Our next two hypotheses examine the direction of firm inefficient investment. Previous
studies have documented two agency problems leading to firm under-investment. First,
it takes managers’ time and effort to look for positive net present value (NPV) projects.
Managers may instead enjoy “the quiet life” if there is a lack of corporate governance
(Hart, 1983; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). Institutional investor monitoring may
inhibit this kind of managerial slack. Second, the outcomes of new projects remain
uncertain, even if managers spend a great amount of effort supervising the projects.
When information is asymmetrical, the ex ante quality of new projects and managerial
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effort are not observable. Many managers’ employment and compensation contracts
are based on the noisy ex post profitability of projects, instead of the ex ante mean of
the projects’ returns and actual managerial effort. Managers may choose not to invest
in positive NPV projects because the possibility of loss could damage their reputation
and job security. Institutional investors may possess greater professional awareness of
the volatility of profitability than do other investors. Aghion et al. (2013) find that
institutional investors may reduce managers’ career concerns and increase firm innova-
tion activities. In addition to these two agency-problem-based explanations, firms may
not capture positive NPV investment opportunities due to the debt overhang problem
(Hennessy, 2004). Institutional investors may mitigate the debt overhang problem by
reducing a firm’s debt borrowing cost. This discussion leads to our second hypothesis:
• H2: Motivated monitoring by institutional investors mitigates firm under-investment.
Managers may use excessive firm cash holdings to pursue benefits for themselves. Jensen
(1986) predicts that the managerial empire building tendency leads to firm over-investment.
The prediction is supported by the empirical findings of Blanchard et al. (1994) that firms
over-invest cash windfalls. Harford (1999) finds that firms with higher cash holdings tend
to make acquisitions with poor subsequent operational performance, while Richardson
(2006) finds that firms with positive free cash flow tend to over-invest. Titman et al.
(2004) document a negative relation between over-investment and stock returns, indicat-
ing that over-investment by managers is not in the interest of shareholders. We expect
that a firm with greater motivated monitoring IO will exhibit less over-investment. For-
mally stated, our third hypothesis is as follows:
• H3: Motivated monitoring by institutional investors mitigates firm over-investment.
3 Data and variable descriptions
3.1 Data sources
Our sample covers U.S. firms with available stock return data in the Centre for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) and accounting information in the Compustat Fundamen-
tals Annual files. Firms in the financial (SIC 6000–6999) and regulated utility (SIC
4900–4999) industries are excluded from our sample. Data on institutional holdings are
obtained from the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13F) database. In
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order to prevent the reuse of institutional investor identifiers and institution type mis-
classification in the 13F database, we apply Brian Bushee’s institution type correction
to our institutional holding data. Our sample period is from 1995 to 2015,7 a period for
which Russell index constituent data are available for use on Bloomberg. Once these
screening criteria have been applied, our baseline sample contains 11, 903 unique firms
with 92, 546 firm–year observations. In addition, we collect the corporate governance
measure, the G-index scores (Gompers et al., 2003), from Institutional Shareholder Ser-
vices (ISS, formerly RiskMetrics).
3.2 Definition of institutions with motivation to monitor
The existing institutional investor literature has documented the growth of general in-
stitutional investors in the U.S. stock market over the past four decades.8 Panel A
of Table A1 shows that both the U.S. stock market value and the total market value
of institutional holdings grew approximately four times over during the sample period.
Institutional holdings accounted for about 50% of the total stock market value in Septem-
ber 1995; 65.5%, the highest level, in September 2009; and 59.6% in September 2015 –
thus the time-series trend of institutional ownership is not a major concern in this study.
The annual average number of stocks in an institutional investor’s portfolio is over 200,
suggesting that a typical institutional investor is unlikely to allocate its monitoring at-
tention evenly to every firm.
We use stock holding value ranking in an investor’s portfolio to differentiate its monitor-
ing motivation among all the stocks in the portfolio. All stocks in an investor’s portfolio
are sorted into ten decile groups by each stock’s holding value. As shown in Panel B
of Table A1, institutional investors distribute their holding value unevenly across these
ten decile groups. On average, more than 40% of their portfolio value is concentrated
in the decile 1 group, which comprises the largest 10% of the holding positions in their
portfolios. In addition, the average holding value per stock position ($105.4 million) in
the decile 1 group is almost five times greater than that in the decile 2 group ($23.7 mil-
lion). In comparison, only 0.7% of institutional investors’ portfolio value is represented
by the decile 10 group, which comprises the smallest 10% of the holding positions in
their portfolios. It is obvious that the performance of the firms in the decile 1 group is
7According to Thomson Reuters, there are some issues with IO data after 2010. Our main results
are robust if we restrict our sample period from 1995 to 2010.
8Institutional holdings accounted for about 50% of the total stock market value in September 1995,
the highest level 65.5% in September 2009, and 59.6% in September 2015. The time-series trend of IO
is not a major concern in our study.
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much more important to institutional investors than is the performance of the rest of the
holding firms in their portfolios. Therefore, we expect that the benefits of monitoring
and the motivation to monitor the firms in the decile 1 group should be the highest of
all the decile groups.
Following Fich et al. (2015), we define institutional investors with the motivation to
monitor a firm as the investors whose decile 1 groups include the firm’s stock. We
aggregate the ownership of all investors with the motivation to monitor at the firm level
and denote the sum as the total motivated monitoring IO: Tmi1i,t. Similarly, the firms
in the decile 10 group are those that institutional investors have the least incentive to
monitor. For comparison purposes, we also aggregate the ownership of these institutional
investors at the firm level and construct the variable Tmi10i,t, the ownership of investors
who have the least motivation to monitor firm i. Panel C of Table A1 shows that, on
average, the ownership of investors with the most motivation to monitor is approximately
9% of firm shares while the ownership of investors with the least motivation to monitor
is only 1% of firm shares. We also calculate two alternative measures of motivated
monitoring IO: Nmi1i,t the number of institutional investors with the most motivation
to monitor and Pmi1i,t the ratio of Nmi1i,t to the number of total institutional investors
in firm i.
3.3 Investment inefficiency measures
We identify inefficient investments as the deviation from the level that would be predicted
by a firm-specific model of investment. Motivated by Richardson (2006) and Stoughton
et al. (2017), we estimate the following regression and use the regression residuals as our
proxies for firm-specific inefficient investment:
INewi,t =α + β1
V
P i,t−1
+ β2Leveragei,t−1 + β3Cashi,t−1 + β4Agei,t−1 + β5Sizei,t−1
+ β6Returni,t−1 + β7INewi,t−1 + δi + µt + εi,t
(1)
where INew i,t is the new investment level for firm i in year t and INewi,t = ITotali,t −
IMaintenancei,t. ITotal i,t is the overall investment, and IMaintenance i,t is the invest-
ment expenditure to maintain assets in place. The previous finance and economics
literature has shown that firm investment is jointly determined by growth opportunities,
financial constraints, and other firm characteristics.9 Firm growth opportunities are
9See Hubbard (1998) for a detailed literature review.
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measured by V/P , where V represents the assets in place and P is the market value of
the firm (Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1996).10 Because P is the sum of V and
the value of future growth, V/P is negatively related to a firm’s growth opportunities.
We expect a negative relation between V/P and INew. The financial constraints are
measured by Leverage and Cash. Because a lower leverage ratio and higher cash hold-
ings indicate lower financial constraints, INew is expected to be negatively related to
Leverage and positively related to Cash. We control for the following firm characteristics
in Equation (1): firm age (Age), the natural log of firm total assets (Size), cumulative
stock returns over the previous year (Return), and the lag of new investment (INew t−1).
We also include the firm fixed effects (δi) to control for unobserved firm characteristics
and the year fixed effects (µt) to control for the factors such as stock market level trends
and business cycles. εi,t are clustered by firm.
11 Following Richardson (2006), all vari-
ables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. Please refer to Appendix A for the
detailed definitions and construction of these variables.
We measure firm inefficient investment in our empirical analyses as Inefi,t = |INewi,t
−ÎNewi,t|. As discussed in the previous sections, both under- and over-investment are
detrimental to the interests of shareholders. However, the underlying mechanisms of
these two cases could be different. We further define the under-investment proxy vari-
able as Undi,t = |INewi,t − ÎNewi,t| if INewi,t < ÎNewi,t and the over-investment
proxy variable as Ovri,t = |INewi,t − ÎNewi,t| if INewi,t > ÎNewi,t. We refine ineffi-
cient investment as regards its direction in order to distinguish the roles of motivated
monitoring by institutional investors in mitigating two different sources of investment
inefficiency.
To avoid the “look ahead bias” concern due to the use of unknown information at the
time of our model prediction, we estimate Equation (1) for each year t of the period
1995–2015 using the historical panel data from 1981 to year t. We trace the sample back
to 1981 in order to increase the power of our optimal investment prediction. For example,
we run a panel regression from 1981 to 1995 to estimate ÎNewi,1995, a panel regression
from 1981 to 1996 to estimate ÎNewi,1996, and so on. The predicted investment ÎNewi,t
is the result of twenty-one historical panel regressions, for each year t from 1995 to
2015. We denote the inefficient investment proxy variables estimated by this procedure
as Inef1i,t , Und1i,t, and Ovr1i,t.
12 Alternatively, we follow Richardson (2006) and
10Richardson (2006) provides the detailed definition of V/P .
11Petersen (2009) suggests that when the number of firms is much larger than the number of years,
clustering standard errors by firm is similar to double clustering standard errors by firm and year.
12We also estimate Equation (1) with five-year historical rolling windows between year t− 4 and year
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Stoughton et al. (2017) to estimate Equation (1) by a single panel regression from 1995
to 2015. The inefficient investment proxy variables are defined as Inef2i,t , Und2i,t, and
Ovr2i,t.
Table A2 reports the corresponding regression results for the two specifications of Equa-
tion (1). The left panel displays the average coefficients estimated by the twenty-one
historical panel regressions. The numbers of negative (−) and positive (+) significant
coefficients at the 1% level are reported in parentheses. The right panel presents the
coefficients estimated by the single panel regression between 1995 and 2015. The neg-
ative coefficients of V/P suggest that firms with good growth opportunities increase
their investment. The negative coefficients of Leverage and the positive coefficients of
Cash indicate that firms with lower financial constraints increase their investment. The
negative coefficients of Size and Age are consistent with the findings in Stoughton et al.
(2017) and the firm life cycle hypothesis. The positive coefficients of Return and INew t−1
are consistent with Richardson (2006) and Stoughton et al. (2017). The average R2 of
the historical panel regressions is 0.208 and the R2 of the single panel regression is
0.259, suggesting that both our investment model specifications can explain a significant
portion of the variations in firm-specific investment.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Panel C of Table A1 presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables in our empirical
analyses. The mean and standard deviation of INew are 0.10 and 0.15, respectively,
which are comparable to those (0.08 and 0.13) reported in Richardson (2006). The
mean and standard deviation of the difference between INew and ÎNew estimated by
the single panel regression are 0.00 and 0.13, respectively, which are similar to those (0.00
and 0.11) reported in Richardson (2006). The summary statistics of all our investment
related variables are also comparable to those of Stoughton et al. (2017). The means of
our motivated monitoring by institutional investor proxies are 0.09 (Tmi1), 9.3 (Nmi1),
and 0.03 (Pmi1), which are comparable to those (0.07, 9.0, and 0.02, respectively)
reported in Fich et al. (2015). Our proxies are slightly larger because Fich et al. (2015)
focus on the institutional investors of M&A targets and their sample is from 1984 to
2011.
t. Our untabulated results are qualitatively similar to those reported in this paper.












In this section, we present the empirical test results for the effectiveness of motivated
monitoring by institutional investors. We first investigate the role of motivated mon-
itoring by institutional investors in firm investment decisions with both ordinary least
squares (OLS) and 2SLS regressions. We then study if the monitoring motivation varies
across different types of institutional investors.
4.1 Motivated monitoring institutional ownership and ineffi-
cient investment: Baseline OLS regressions
In untabulated tests, we find that inefficient investment is negatively associated with
firm subsequent stock performance.13 Therefore, we expect that institutional investors
with motivation to monitor are incentivized to monitor firm investment activities and
increase firm investment efficiency. To test our three hypotheses, we adapt the following
baseline model to capture the effects of institutional investors on investment:
Inefficient investment i,t+1 =α + β1Tmi1i,t + β2 ∗ Tmi10i,t +B ∗ Control variables i,t
+ θj + µt + εi,t
(2)
where Inefficient investment i,t+1 is one of the following six proxies: Inef1, Und1, Ovr1,
Inef2, Und2, and Ovr2. Tmi1 is the total ownership of institutional investors with the
most motivation to monitor. To help us differentiate the monitoring roles of investors
with the most motivation to monitor from those with the least motivation to monitor,
we add Tmi10 in Equation (2), either individually or jointly, along with Tmi1. We
follow Stoughton et al. (2017) and control for MTB, Leverage, Cash, Size,14 Tangibility,
and Age. To control for industry-specific and time-specific investment variations, we
include the Fama–French 48 industry (θj) and year (µt) fixed effects in Equation (2).
The standard errors are clustered by firm.
Table A3 presents the results of estimating Equation (2). Panel A is based on the ineffi-
cient variables estimated by the historical panel regressions and Panel B is based on those
estimated by the single panel regression. All the coefficients of Tmi1 are negative and
13Results are available upon request.
14To mitigate the concern that our monitoring motivation measure may simply pick up a size effect,
we control for firm size in both Equation (1) and (2).
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statistically significant, suggesting that motivated monitoring by institutional investors
improves firm investment efficiency. Both under- and over-investment are mitigated by
institutional investors with motivation to monitor. These results are consistent with our
three hypotheses. On the other hand, we find that Tmi10 has a significantly positive
effect on Inef in both Panel A and Panel B, indicating that firms with greater Tmi10
(least motivated monitoring IO) make a more inefficient investment. This positive re-
lation is only statistically significant in the under-investment subsample, which may be
explained by either the “quiet life” hypothesis or managers’ career concerns. We directly
test these two explanations in Section 5.
4.2 Motivated monitoring by institutional investors and ineffi-
cient investment: 2SLS regressions
Our baseline regression results may be driven by the endogeneity between motivated
monitoring by institutional investors and inefficient investment. The first concern is the
potential omitted variable bias. Although we have controlled for several firm charac-
teristics in Equation (2), there may be some unobserved firm characteristics correlated
with both motivated monitoring IO and inefficient investment. The second concern in-
volves the reverse causality that institutional investors with motivation to monitor may
have private information on firms’ investment efficiency, and may choose to invest more
in firms with higher investment efficiency (Giannetti and Simonov, 2006). Inspired by
recent studies on firms switching between the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes, we adopt
an IV approach similar to Fich et al. (2015), Crane et al. (2016), and Schmidt and
Fahlenbrach (2017).
The Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes are reconstituted in June each year. Based on
the market capitalization of the common stocks of U.S. firm at May 31, the largest
1, 000 firms are included in the Russell 1000 index and the subsequent 2, 000 firms are
included in the Russell 2000 index.15 In 2005, about $90 billion worth of institutional
assets tracked the Russell 1000 index and about $200 billion worth of institutional assets
tracked the Russell 2000 index (Chang et al., 2015). Both indexes are value-weighted
and no other criteria besides market capitalization is used in the index reconstitution.
Therefore, when a stock drops from the Russell 1000 to the Russell 2000 index or is
added in the Russell 2000 index for the first time, the index tracking IO of the stock will
15The London Stock Exchange (LSE) bought Russell Investments in 2014. The merged firm is
called FTSE Russell. For the detailed explanations of the Russell Index reconstitution, please refer
to www.ftserussell.com/research-insights/russell-reconstitution.
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increase exogenously. In a similar manner, there is a negative and exogenous shock on
a firm’s index tracking IO when a stock moves up from the Russell 2000 to the Russell
1000 index or is excluded from the Russell 2000 index. When index tracking institutions
adjust the stock weights in their portfolio, there will also be an exogenous shock on
the stock weights in the other institutions’ portfolios. This is because the Russell index
reconstitution may affect stock returns (Chang et al., 2015) and institutional investors
usually trade with each other. For the firms that are not affected by the Russell index
reconstitution, there is still an exogenous shock on their weights in the institutional
portfolios when institutional investors adjust the weights of the other affected stocks
over the annual Russell index reconstitution periods.
The switch of firms between the two Russell indexes and the inclusion of firms in or their
exclusion from the Russell 2000 index are used as the IVs in our first stage regression:
Tmi1i,t =α + β1R1TR2i,t + β2R2TR1i,t + β3R2TNi,t + β4NTR2i,t
+B ∗ Control variables i,t + θj + µt + εi,t
(3)
where R1TR2i,t (R2TR1i,t) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i switches from
the Russell 1000 (2000) index to the Russell 2000 (1000) index in year t and 0 oth-
erwise. R2TNi,t (NTR2i,t) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i leaves (enters)
the Russell 2000 index and 0 otherwise. The relevancy condition of our IVs is satisfied
because the index reconstitution affects the motivated monitoring IO in all firms. The
exclusion restriction is also satisfied because stock returns are stochastic and the only
index assignment rule is mechanically based on the rank of stock market capitalization.
Firms switching between the two Russell indexes should not have any direct effect on
their investment behavior. We control for MTB, Leverage, Cash, Size, Tangibility, and
Age in Equation (3). θj and µt are the Fama–French 48 industry and year fixed effects,
respectively. In the second stage regression, we estimate Equation (2) by replacing Tmi1
with T̂mi1, the predicted value of motivated monitoring IO from Equation (3).
Panel A of Table A4 presents the 2SLS regression results. Column (1) reports the first
stage regression results. R1TR2, R2TN , and NTR2 are negatively associated with
Tmi1, while R1TR2 is positively correlated with it. The signs of our IV coefficients are
generally in line with those of Fich et al. (2015). The results of the second stage regres-
sions are presented in Columns (2)–(7). In Columns (2) and (5), the dependent variables
are proxies for firm inefficient investment: Inef1 and Inef2. The coefficients of T̂mi1
are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level, supporting our hypothesis H1
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that motivated monitoring by institutional investors improves firm investment efficiency.
In Columns (3) and (6), the dependent variables are under-investment proxies: Und1
and Und2. The coefficients of T̂mi1 remain negative and statistically significant at the
1% level. The marginal effect of T̂mi1 on the under-investment proxies is economically
significant. For example, a one standard deviation increase in T̂mi1 is associated with
a 0.86% decrease in Und1 for the average sample-size firm with $2,648.1 million worth
of total assets. This result confirms our hypothesis H2 that motivated monitoring by
institutional investors mitigates firm under-investment. In Columns (4) and (7), the
dependent variables are over-investment proxies: Ovr1 and Ovr2. The negative and
statistically significant coefficients of T̂mi1 confirm that motivated monitoring by in-
stitutional investors mitigates firm over-investment. The economic significance is such
that a one standard deviation increase in T̂mi1 results in a 2.27% decrease in Ovr1,
which translates into a $60.1 million reduction in annual over-investment for the aver-
age sample-size firm. This result provides direct support for our hypothesis H3 that
motivated monitoring by institutional investors can mitigate firm over-investment.
As an alternative test, we adopt the first difference specification used in Schmidt and
Fahlenbrach (2017) to remove any firm-specific time-invariant unobservable firm char-
acteristics. We replace all the dependent variables and control variables of firm charac-
teristics in Panel A of Table A4 by their annual change terms. The first difference spec-
ification may further mitigate the causality concern that institutional investors choose
to invest more in firms with higher investment efficiency. Panel B of Table A4 presents
the results of our 2SLS regressions with the first difference specification. We find that
the increase in motivated monitoring IO may reduce the subsequent firms’ investment
inefficiency.
4.3 Monitoring motivation and institution types
Institutional investors differ in terms of investment strategies, fiduciary duties, and
trading horizons. Previous studies have documented that long-term and independent
investors are more active in monitoring firms than are short-term and grey investors
(Chen et al., 2007). However, Appel et al. (2016b) find that by removing firms’ takeover
defenses and increasing firms’ equal voting rights, passive mutual funds may improve
firm governance and long-term performance. Institutional investors with motivation to
monitor include all types of investors covered in the 13F universe. Therefore, a natural
question is whether the monitoring motivation of institutional investors varies across
different institution types.
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First, we divide institutional investors into independent (Tmi Ind) and grey investors
(Tmi Grey), based on the business relationship between institutional investors and the
firms in which they hold stocks (e.g., Brickley et al., 1988; Almazan et al., 2005; Chen
et al., 2007). Independent investment advisors, investment companies, and public pen-
sion funds are classified as independent investors. Private pension funds, banks, and
insurance companies are classified as grey investors because their monitoring ability
may be compromised due to business interests.16 Second, we separate institutional in-
vestors into transient (Tmi Tran) and non-transient investors (Tmi1 NonTran) based
on their investment horizons. Bushee (1998) classifies institutional investors as dedi-
cated, quasi-index, and transient investors based on their investment patterns such as
those of portfolio turnover, diversification, and momentum, etc. Following Chen et al.
(2007), we take transient investors as short-term investors, while dedicated and quasi-
index investors as non-transient or long-term investors.
Panel A of Table A5 presents the 2SLS regression results of inefficient investment on
Tmi Ind and Tmi Grey and Panel B of Table A5 presents similar regression results
for those variables in first difference terms. Similarly, Panel C of Table A5 presents the
2SLS regression results of inefficient investment on Tmi Tran and Tmi NonTran and
Panel D of Table A5 presents the regression results for those variables in first difference
terms. Among all specifications, the motivated monitoring IO proxies are negatively
related to investment inefficiency. These results suggest that the monitoring incentives
derived from the relative importance of firms in institutional investors’ portfolios are
independent of investor characteristics. As conjectured by Chen et al. (2007), grey and
transient institutions are less likely to engage in monitoring activities. However, we
find that even for the institutions usually taken as inefficient monitors, the benefits
of monitoring still increase with the holding firms’ relative value in their portfolios.17
Therefore, all institutional investors with motivation to monitor improve firm investment
efficiency, regardless of their types.
16We follow Brian Bushee’s institution type classification for institutional investors after 1998.
17In terms of economic effect, independent and non-transient investors still have a stronger impact
on investment inefficiency than do grey and transient investors. The means of Tmi Ind (0.07) and
Tmi NonTran (0.06) are greater than those of Tmi Grey (0.02) and Tmi Tran (0.02), as reported in
Panel C of Table A1.
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4.4 Alternative measures of motivated monitoring by institu-
tional investors
In our main analyses, we use the ownership of institutional investors with motivation to
monitor as our proxy for investor monitoring attention. To address the concern that the
distribution of TmiN is highly skewed,18 we examine the two alternative measures of
motivated monitoring IO that have been used in Fich et al. (2015): (1) the proportion of
institutional investors with motivation to monitor among a firm’s institutional investors
(Pmi1), and (2) the natural log of one plus the number of institutional investors with
motivation to monitor (Ln(1 + Nmi1)). We rerun our 2SLS regression analyses, i.e.,
Equation (2) and (3). We substitute Pmi1 and Ln(1+Nmi1) as the dependent variables
in the first stage regressions and use their predicted values as independent variables in
the second stage regressions. The results are tabulated in Panel A and Panel B of Table
A6. We find that the negative relation between motivated monitoring IO and inefficient
investment remains robust with these two alternative measures.
Based on a cost-benefit trade-off, institutional investors should consider not only the
ranking of stocks in their portfolios, but also the absolute size of their positions in each
stock. Institutional investors are motivated to monitor firms that form a significant per-
centage of their portfolio, where the reward of monitoring will be the greatest. However,
monitoring costs are lower when institutional investors possess greater voting rights.
Hence, institutional investors are most likely to monitor firms when they both possess
significant control over the firm and have a considerable portfolio allocation to the firm.
Next, we construct a general measure of monitoring attention-weighted institutional
ownership that covers both an investor’s monitoring attention to a firm and its control
over the firm:
TMAi = ln(1 +
N∑
j=1
ωi,j ∗ IOi,j ∗ 10000) (4)
where TMAi is the total institutional investor monitoring attention to firm i, N is the
total number of institutions investing in firm i, ωi,j is the market value weighting of firm
i’s stock in institution j’s portfolio, and IOi,j is the ownership by institution j in firm
i. In our aggregate measure, ωi,j represents institution j’s motivation to monitor firm
i and IOi,j represents institution j’s monitoring power over firm i. Intuitively, TMA
is a weighted average of a firm’s IO, with the weights being the institutional investors’
18The mean of Tmi1 is 0.09 and the mean of Tmi10 is 0.01.
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monitoring motivation. Panel C of Table A1 reports the summary statistics for TMA.
We predict that a firm with a greater TMA has higher aggregated institutional investor
monitoring attention. Consistent with our prediction, Panel C of Table A6 shows that
the coefficients of IV TMA are all negative and statistically significant in the second
stage regressions.19
5 Further discussions and robustness tests
Our results so far have documented a significantly negative relation between motivated
monitoring IO and firm inefficient investment. Next, we attempt to investigate the
channels through which institutional investors with motivation to monitor mitigate firm
over- and under-investment. We conclude this section with a battery of robustness tests.
5.1 Motivated monitoring, cash, and over-investment
Empire building activities may increase the resources under the control of a firm’s man-
agers (Jensen, 1986). From an agency perspective, managers have an incentive to over-
invest and grow their firms beyond the optimal size. Previous studies have documented
that the empire building problem is more severe for firms with larger amounts of free
cash flow (e.g., Stulz, 1990; Lang et al., 1991; Brush et al., 2000; Richardson, 2006).
Motivated monitoring by institutional investors should therefore have a more important
role of curbing managers’ over-investment tendencies when firms have more cash reserves
or free cash flows. We test this hypothesis with the following model specification:
Ovri,t+1 =α + β1T̂mi1i,t + β2T̂mi1i,t ∗ Cash measures i,t + β3Cash measures i,t
+B ∗ Control variables i,t + θj + µt + εi,t
(5)
where T̂mi1i,t is the predicted value of Tmi1i,t in Equation (3), Cash measures are either
the cash reserve ratio (Cash) or the free cash flow (FCF ), and Control variables are the
same as those used in Equation (2). We adopt Richardson’s (2006) FCF definition:20
FCFi,t = Operating cash flow i,t − IMaintaincei,t +R&Di,t − ÎNewi,t (6)
19Our findings are robust in OLS regressions.
20Because two different specifications are used to estimate the predicted new investment ÎNew, we
accordingly have two measures of free cash flows. ÎNew is estimated by the historical panel regressions
in FCF1 and the single panel regression in FCF2.
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Empire building is usually observed in firms with positive free cash flows (Richardson,
2006). When estimating Equation (5), we follow Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007)
and exclude the firm–year observations with negative FCF. The regression results of
Equation (5), presented in Table A7, show that firms with more cash holdings and free
cash flows are more likely to over-invest. This finding is consistent with the prediction
that managers may engage in empire building and over-invest firms’ abundant cash.
More importantly, the coefficients (β2) of the interaction terms are all negative and
statistically significant, indicating that the role of institutional investors with motivation
to monitor in firm over-investment is more important for firms with a higher empire
building tendency.
5.2 “Quiet life” or “career concern”
Firms may under-invest if managers do not exert enough effort to seek investment op-
portunities. There are two possible explanations that predict firm under-investment
given a lack of investor monitoring. On the one hand, managers may prefer a “quiet
life” (e.g., Hart, 1983; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003), because it is costly for them
to seek positive NPV projects and make difficult investment decisions. We refer to the
first explanation as the “quiet life” hypothesis. On the other hand, managers are risk
averse and may choose not to invest in risky projects. Rather than being lazy, managers
may have job security concerns if their new projects have unfavorable outcomes due to
random factors (Aghion et al., 2013). We designate the second potential explanation as
the “career concern” hypothesis.
Although motivated monitoring by institutional investors may mitigate firm under-
investment, the predicted joint effect of shareholder monitoring and other external moni-
toring on firm under-investment differs according to the “quiet life” and “career concern”
hypotheses. If the “quiet life” hypothesis is correct, monitoring by investors has a less
important role when market competition is higher. This is because market competition
is positively related to the probability of firm bankruptcy (Hart, 1983). Firm managers
are less likely to enjoy “quiet lives” in a competitive market. However, the “career con-
cern” hypothesis predicts the opposite. In a highly competitive market, the probabilities
of failures of new projects are higher, which would thus increase the career concerns of
firm managers and lead to under-investment. Institutional investors may alleviate the
managers’ career concerns as these investors are informed and can effectively distinguish
random negative outcomes from a lack of managerial ability (Aghion et al., 2013). There-
fore, if the “career concern” hypothesis is correct, monitoring by institutional investors
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has a more important role in mitigating under-investment when market competition is
greater.
These two hypotheses also have opposite predictions when managerial entrenchment is
high. If the “quiet life” hypothesis is correct, managers with a lower risk of being fired
have less incentive to seek investment opportunities. Therefore, monitoring by investors
has a stronger effect on mitigating firm under-investment when managers are more en-
trenched. However, managers have more job security when managerial entrenchment is
higher. If the “career concern” hypothesis is correct, managers are less likely to under-
invest when their jobs are more entrenched. Therefore, monitoring by investors has a
weaker effect in mitigating firm under-investment in this case. We use the following
model specification to test these two possible hypotheses:
Undi,t+1 =α + β1T̂mi1i,t + β2T̂mi1i,t ∗ Competition or Entrenchment i,t + β3
Competition or Entrenchment i,t +B ∗ Control variables i,t + θj + µt + εi,t
(7)
where Competition is 1− Lerner ratio (Aghion et al., 2013) and Entrenchment is Gom-
pers et al.’s (2003) G-index. The Lerner ratio is the median growth margin of the
industry to which firms are assigned.21 As the G-index is only available for the S&P
1500 companies from 1995 to 2007, our sample size for the entrenchment analysis is
smaller than it is for the main tests.
Table A8 presents the results. Consistent with the “career concern” hypothesis, when
market competition is greater and managers are less entrenched, the under-investment
problem is more severe. Furthermore, when career concerns are greater, the effect of
motivated monitoring by institutional investors on under-investment is more prominent.
These results support the “career concern” hypothesis but oppose the “quiet life” hy-
pothesis.
5.3 Institutional ownership by decile monitoring motivation
In Table A3, we show that Tmi1 and Tmi10 have opposite effects on firm investment
inefficiency. To further support our view that the motivation of institutional monitor-
ing is positively associated with the relative importance of firm stocks in institutional
portfolios, we sort all stocks into decile groups by their holding value in institutional
21Following Aghion et al. (2013), the Lerner ratio is based on 3-digit SIC codes and the industry
fixed effects are based on 4-digit SIC codes in the regressions related to market competition.
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portfolios. Panel C of Table A1 reports the summary statistics for these decile groups.
Extending the definitions of Tmi1 and Tmi10, we define TmiN where N takes an inte-
ger value from 1 to 10. TmiN represents the ownership of a firm held by institutional
investors whose portfolios include the firm’s stock in the decile N group. We test the
relation between Inef and TmiN by the 2SLS regression specification reported in Table
A4.
Panel A and Panel B of Table A9 present the results of the second stage regressions.
The dependent variables are Inef1 in Panel A and Inef2 in Panel B. The coefficients of
TmiN follow a similar pattern in both Panel A and Panel B. The estimated coefficients
of Tmi1–Tmi3 are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that institutional
investors have a monitoring role in a firm’s investment when the weighting of the firm’s
stock is among the top 30% in their portfolios. The coefficient of Tmi4 is negative
but statistically insignificant. In contrast, the estimated coefficients of Tmi5–Tmi10
are positive and statistically significant, suggesting that institutional investors have a
lack of motivation to monitor a firm with a bottom 60% weighting ranking in their
portfolios. In addition, the results show that the estimated coefficients of Tmi1–Tmi10
increase monotonically from negative to positive. Taken together, our results indicate
that as monitoring motivation decreases, firm investment inefficiency increases. The
monitoring motivation of institutional investors is not evenly allocated among all firms
in institutional portfolios.
5.4 Discussion of IV identification using the Russell index re-
constitution
The identification of our IVs is slightly different from that in Fich et al. (2015) and
Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2017). We do not include Russell’s float-adjusted market
cap-based rankings as IV in our 2SLS regressions. As indicated by Appel et al. (2016a),
the float-adjusted market cap-based rankings are affected by insider ownership and liquid
outstanding shares. The impact of the Russell index reconstitution on changes in IO
may be over-stated if we include the rankings as IV.22 The other issue is that Russell
adopted a “banding” rule to index assignment in 2007.23 Although we use the IV method
instead of the regression discontinuity method (e.g., Chang et al., 2015) in our paper,
we rerun the regressions reported in Table A4 in a restricted sample period 1995–2006.
22Please refer to Appel et al. (2016a) for detailed discussions.
23Please refer to Crane et al. (2016) for detailed discussions.
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Our untabulated test results are similar to those in Table A4.
5.5 Discussions of how motivated monitoring by institutional
investors influences managerial decisions
In Section 5.1 and 5.2, we attribute the increase in investment efficiency to the mon-
itoring of motivated institutional investors by revealing a more pronounced effect for
over-investing firms with excess cash flows and under-investing firms subject to greater
competitive pressures. In this section, we further discuss two other mechanisms by which
motivated investors may influence managers’ investment decisions. First, if institutional
investors with motivation to monitor engage in closer monitoring, then these investors
may be involved more in proxy voting. A recent study by Schwartz-Ziv and Wermers
(2017) investigates the relation between institutional investors’ voting on Say-On-Pay
(SOP) proposals and their monitoring motivation. When firms implement SOP votes,
“behind the scenes” discussions between firm managers and shareholders are particu-
larly likely to occur (McCahery et al., 2016). Schwartz-Ziv and Wermers (2017) predict
that institutional investors are more likely to focus on firms with a larger weight in their
portfolio and to communicate with these firms’ managers in private before the SOP vot-
ing. Consistent with this prediction, Schwartz-Ziv and Wermers (2017) find that higher
portfolio weights lead to a greater support rate in SOP voting due to the communica-
tion before the voting. The finding in Schwartz-Ziv and Wermers (2017) provides us
with direct evidence that the institutional investors’ engagement with firm managers is
positively related to their monitoring motivation.
The second potential mechanism that motivated monitoring by institutional investors
improves firm governance is through forced CEO turnover. We collect forced CEO
turnover data for all firms in the S&P ExecuComp database during the period 1995–
2005 from Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013). We find that for firms covered by ExecuComp,
a higher motivated monitoring IO leads to a larger likelihood of forced CEO turnover
in the next fiscal year, after controlling for industry and year fixed effects. This relation
is robust for Tmil, Pmi1, Ln(1 + Nmi1), and TMA.24 A one standard deviation
increase in Tmil1 is associated with a 0.25% decrease in the likelihood of future forced
CEO turnover. Given that the unconditional sample mean of forced CEO turnover
in ExecuComp is 1.4%, the effect of Tmi1 on the forced CEO turnover probability is
economically significant. Our results confirm that motivated monitoring by institutional
24Our results are available upon request.











investors can influence management through the occurrences of forced CEO turnover.
6 Conclusions
Managers may potentially either under-invest or over-invest due to agency problems.
Both types of inefficient investment may negatively impact firms’ subsequent perfor-
mance. Institutional investors may mitigate firm inefficient investment through mon-
itoring and activism, thereby benefiting from the subsequent improved performance.
However, the attention of institutional investors is limited (Kempf et al., 2017). If a
firm represents only a very small proportion of institutional investors’ portfolios, the
opportunity cost of monitoring a firm may exceed the benefit of doing so. We there-
fore follow Fich et al. (2015) in measuring the motivation of an institutional investor to
monitor a firm by the relative importance of the firm’s stock in the institution’s port-
folio. We find that institutional investors with the greater motivation to monitor firm
performance are associated with improved firm investment efficiency. By extending the
measure of abnormal investment developed in Richardson (2006), we show that higher
motivated monitoring IO is associated with inefficient investment (both too little and
too much). A similar relation is not found between investors with the least motivation
to monitor and firms’ inefficient investment, a result that is consistent with the limited
attention hypothesis.
Our paper sheds light on the ongoing debate on whether all types of institutional in-
vestors, including grey and passive ones, contribute to corporate governance. Our evi-
dence suggests that as long as the holdings of a firm stock are important to institutional
investors, even grey and passive institutional investors may improve firms’ investment
decisions. We also document the channels through which motivated institutional in-
vestors can mitigate inefficient investment. The role of investors’ monitoring in reducing
over-investment is stronger if firms have greater cash reserves and free cash flows, while
the role of investors’ monitoring in reducing under-investment is stronger when firm
managers are more likely to have concerns about their future careers. Overall, our re-
sults establish a robust link between motivated monitoring by institutional investors and
corporate investment efficiency.
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Table A1. Variable definitions
This table provides variable definitions and corresponding data sources. CRSP refers to
the Centre for Research in Security Prices, ISS refers to the Institutional Shareholder
Services (formerly RiskMetrics), 13F refers to the Thomson Reuters 13F Database, and
Bushee’s website refers to http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html.
Variable Definition Source
Investment regression variables
AT Total assets. Compustat
ITotal Annual total investment expenditure normalized by AT :
[Capital expenditure(CAPX) + acquisition
expenditure(AQC) + R&D expenditure(XRD) − Receipts
from sale of property, plant and equipment(SPPE)]/AT
(Richardson, 2006).
Compustat
IMaintenance Annual required investment expenditure to maintain assets
in place normalized by AT :
Depreciation and amortization(DPC)/AT (Richardson,
2006).
Compustat
INew Annual investment expenditure on new projects normalized
by AT : ITotal − IMaintenance (Richardson, 2006).
Compustat
MV Market value of equity: price(PRCC F) * common shares
outstanding (CSHO).
Compustat
V/P Growth opportunity: Assets in place/MV, where the assets
in place are estimated as (1− αr)BV + α(1 + r)X − αrd,
α=ω/1 + r − ω, r = 12%, ω = 0.62, BV is the book value of
equity(CEQ), d is annual dividend(DVC), and X is
operating income after depreciation(OIADP) (Ohlson, 1995;
Richardson, 2006).
Compustat
Leverage Leverage ratio: the book value of total debt (long-term
debt(DLTT) + short-term debt(DLC)) divided by the sum
of the book value of total debt and BV (Richardson, 2006).
Compustat
Cash Cash holding ratio: cash and short-term investment(CHE)
divided by AT at the start of year (Richardson, 2006).
Compustat
Age Firm age: the natural log of (1 + the number of years the
firm has been listed on CRSP as of the start of year)
(Richardson, 2006).
CRSP
Size The natural log of AT at the start of year (Richardson,
2006).
Compustat
Continued on next page











Table A1 - continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
Return The percentage change of firm market value over the
previous year: MVt/MVt−1 −1 (Richardson, 2006).
CRSP
MTB Market-to-book ratio: market value of asset
(MV+Total debt) divided by AT (Stoughton et al., 2017).
Compustat
Tangibility Firm asset tangibility:
Property Plant and Equipment(PPENT)/AT (Stoughton
et al., 2017).
Compustat
Inef1 Inefficient investment proxy variable: |INew − ÎNew|,
where ÎNewt is estimated by historical panel regressions
between 1982 and year t.
Compustat &
CRSP








Inef2 Inefficient investment proxy variable: |INew − ÎNew|,
where ÎNew is estimated by panel regressions between 1995
and 2015 (Richardson, 2006).
Compustat &
CRSP








Variables related to institutional investors
Nmi1 Number of investors with motivation to monitor: number of
investors whose holding value in the firm is in the top 10%
of their portfolios (Fich et al., 2015).
13F
Nmi10 Number of investors who have the least motivation to
monitor firms: number of investors whose holding value in
the firm is in the bottom 10% of their portfolios.
13F
Tmi1 Total firm ownership of investors with motivation to monitor
(Fich et al., 2015).
13F
Tmi10 Total firm ownership of investors who have the least
motivation to monitor firms.
13F
Tmi1 Ind Total firm ownership of investors with motivation to monitor
who are classified as independent institutional investors.
13F & Bushee’s
website
Tmi1 Grey Total firm ownership of investors with motivation to monitor
who are classified as grey institutional investors.
13F & Bushee’s
website
Tmi1 Tran Total firm ownership of investors with motivation to monitor
who are classified as transient institutional investors.
13F & Bushee’s
website
Tmi1 NonTran Total firm ownership of investors with motivation to monitor
who are classified as non-transient institutional investors.
13F & Bushee’s
website
Pmi1 Proportion of motivated institutional investors: ratio of
Nmi1 to number of firm institutional investors.
13F
Continued on next page











Table A1 - continued from previous page
Variable Definition Source
TMA Total institutional investor monitoring attention. 13F
Note: IV is used as a prefix for all predicted institutional investor variables in 2SLS regressions.
IV in 2SLS regressions
R1TR2 Indicator variable: 1 if a firm switches from the Russell 1000
to the Russell 2000 index, and 0 otherwise (Fich et al., 2015).
Bloomberg
R2TN Indicator variable: 1 if a firm drops out of the Russell 2000
index due to decrease in market value, and 0 otherwise (Fich
et al., 2015).
Bloomberg
R2TR1 Indicator variable: 1 if a firm switches from the Russell 2000
to the Russell 1000 index, and 0 otherwise (Fich et al., 2015).
Bloomberg
NTR2 Indicator variable: 1 if a firm gets newly included in the
Russell 2000 index due to increase in market value, and 0
otherwise (Fich et al., 2015).
Bloomberg
Others
Competition Industry competition level is defined as 1 − Lerner ratio,
where the Lerner ratio is the industry median gross margin
(Revenue(SALE) – Cost of goods sale(COGS))/Revenue.
Firms are assigned by 3-digit SIC codes (Aghion et al.,
2013).
Compustat
G-index Numbers of anti-takeover provisions (Gompers et al., 2003). ISS
FCF1 Free cash flow: Operatingcashflow(OANCF )−
IMaintenance+R&D(XRD)− ÎNew, where ÎNewt is




FCF2 Free cash flow: Operatingcashflow(OANCF )−
IMaintenance+R&D(XRD)− ÎNew, where ÎNew is

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel C. Main variables. This panel presents the descriptive statistics of the firm and
institutional investor variables in our sample. The sample period is between 1995 and 2015.
All firms have complete information in the CRSP and Compustat databases. We also require
that our sample firms have institutional ownership information from the Thomson Financial
CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13F) database. The number of observations, mean, standard
deviation, minimum, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile, and maximum are reported
from left to right in sequence for each variable. Detailed definitions of all variables can be
found in Appendix A.
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min p25 Median p75 Max
Investment regression variables
AT 92,546 2,648.1 7,563.3 2.3 62.2 265.5 1,302.2 47,604.0
ITotal 92,546 0.15 0.15 -0.03 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.74
IMaintenance 92,546 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.24
INew 92,546 0.10 0.15 -0.18 0.00 0.05 0.14 0.71
MV 92,546 3,864.9 17,935.9 0.0 60.7 281.6 1,327.0 630,000.0
V/P 92,546 0.49 0.71 -2.74 0.20 0.44 0.74 3.07
Leverage 92,546 0.31 0.33 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.48 1.71
Cash 92,546 0.22 0.30 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.30 1.59
Age 92,546 2.24 1.01 0.00 1.61 2.30 3.00 4.19
Size 92,546 5.35 2.46 0.00 3.79 5.36 7.01 10.69
Return 92,546 0.21 0.85 -0.87 -0.25 0.00 0.39 4.48
MTB 92,546 1.86 1.81 0.27 0.83 1.25 2.10 11.10
Tangibility 92,546 0.26 0.24 0.00 0.08 0.18 0.39 0.91
Excess Return FF25 78,602 -0.02 0.57 -2.03 -0.33 -0.09 0.18 14.63
INew − ÎNew1 84,731 0.01 0.13 -0.43 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.77
INew − ÎNew2 84,731 0.00 0.13 -0.44 -0.07 -0.02 0.04 0.76
Inef1 84,731 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.77
Und1 47,613 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.43
Ovr1 37,118 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.15 0.77
Inef2 84,731 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.76
Und2 47,613 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.44
Ovr2 37,118 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.13 0.76
Variables related to institutional investors
Tmi1 92,546 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.00
Tmi10 92,546 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 1.00
Nmi1 92,546 9.3 41 0 0 0 3 1,058
Nmi10 92,546 9.2 10 0 3 6 12 295
Tmi1 Ind 92,546 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.00
Tmi1 Grey 92,546 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Tmi1 Tran 92,546 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.00
Tmi1 NonTran 92,546 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 1.00
Pmi1 92,546 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 1.00
TMA 92,546 2.46 1.70 0.00 0.85 2.68 3.75 9.09
Instrumental variables in 2SLS regressions
R1TR2 94,648 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
R2TN 94,648 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
R2TR1 94,648 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
NTR2 94,648 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Others
Competition 92,545 0.63 0.15 0.15 0.53 0.64 0.74 3.04
G-index 7,317 8.94 2.66 1.00 7.00 9.00 11.00 17.00
FCF1 84,731 -0.04 0.18 -0.92 -0.10 -0.01 0.06 0.60
FCF2 84,731 -0.05 0.18 -0.94 -0.11 -0.02 0.05 0.50











Table A2. Optimal investment expenditure regressions
This table reports the regression coefficients of the optimal investment expenditure model
developed by Richardson (2006). The dependent variable is INew measured in year t.
The independent variables are V/P , Leverage, Cash, Size, Return, Age, and INew t−1.
Detailed definitions of these variables are described in Appendix A. In the historical panel
regressions, we run a panel regression with firm–year observations between 1982 and year
t, for each year t in our sample period 1995–2015. We only report the time-series average
of the coefficients estimated by twenty-one historical panel regressions. The numbers of
positive and negative coefficients at the 1% statistical significance level are reported in
parentheses. In the single panel regression, we run a panel regression over our sample
period 1995–2015. The standard errors are clustered by firm in both regressions. t-values
are reported in brackets. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively. Firm and year fixed effects are controlled in all regressions.





(- 21, + 0) [-19.26]
Leveraget−1 -0.091 Leveraget−1 -0.082***
(- 21, + 0) [-24.76]
Casht−1 0.033 Casht−1 0.030***
(- 0, + 21) [10.10]
Sizet−1 -0.008 Sizet−1 -0.009***
(- 21, + 0) [-18.42]
Returnt−1 0.009 Returnt−1 0.007***
(- 0, + 21) [11.35]
Aget−1 -0.011 Aget−1 -0.002
(- 21, + 0) [-1.01]
INewt−1 0.115 INewt−1 0.124***
(- 0, + 21) [19.24]
Constant 0.166 Constant 0.166***
(- 0, + 21) [50.69]
Average Observation 89,129 Observations 84,731
Average Adj. R-Squared 0.208 Adj. R-squared 0.259
Year fixed effects Yes Year fixed effects Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Firm fixed effects Yes
Number of historical panels 21












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A5. Motivated monitoring institutional ownership by institution type
This table presents the 2SLS regression results of firm inefficient investment on the differ-
ent types of motivated monitoring institutional ownership. In Panel A and B, we divide
Tmi1 into motivated monitoring independent institutional ownership Tmi1 Ind and
motivated monitoring grey institutional ownership Tmi1 Grey. In Panel C and D, we
divide Tmi1 into motivated monitoring transient institutional ownership Tmi1 Tran
and motivated monitoring non-transient institutional ownership Tmi1 NonTran. In
Panel A and C, the dependent variables in the first stage regressions are the levels of
motivated monitoring institutional ownership. In Panel B and D, the dependent vari-
ables in the first stage regressions are the changes in motivated monitoring institutional
ownership, from year t−1 to year t. The independent variables of interest in the second
stage regressions are the predicted ownership by the first stage regressions. In all four
panels, the IVs used in the first stage regressions are the indicator variables: R1TR2,
R2TR1, R2TN , and NTR2. In Panel A and C (Panel B and D), our sample in the first
stage regressions consists of 92, 546 (84, 731) firm–year observations with available data
from the CRSP, Compustat, and 13F databases during 1995–2015. In Panel A and C,
the dependent variables in the second stage regressions are firm inefficient investment
proxy variables Inef1 estimated by the historical panel regressions and Inef2 estimated
by the single panel regression. In Panel B and D, the dependent variables in the second
stage regressions are the changes in the firm inefficient investment proxy variables from
year t to year t+1: ∆Inef1 and ∆Inef2. All the control variables are the same as those
reported in Table A4 and their estimated coefficients are suppressed for brevity. Detailed
definitions of all variables are described in Appendix A. Fama–French 48 industry and
year fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. The standard errors are clustered
by firm. t-values are reported in brackets. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Inef1 Inef2 Inef1 Inef2
Panel A. Independent vs. grey investors
IV Tmi1 Ind -0.140*** -0.112***
[-3.95] [-4.28]
IV Tmi1 Grey -0.281*** -0.309***
[-3.12] [-3.58]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 80,031 80,031 80,031 80,031
Adj. R-squared 0.160 0.164 0.160 0.164
Continued on next page











Table A5 - continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Inef1 Inef2 Inef1 Inef2
Panel B. Change in independent vs. change in grey investors
IV∆Tmi1 Ind -1.068*** -0.972***
[-3.48] [-3.31]
IV∆Tmi1 Grey -1.647** -1.592**
[-2.18] [-2.25]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 73,466 73,466 73,466 73,466
Adj. R-squared 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.020
Panel C. Transient vs. non-transient investors
IV Tmi1 Tran -0.237*** -0.245***
[-3.62] [-3.90]
IV Tmi1 NonTran -0.132*** -0.143***
[-3.50] [-3.95]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 80,031 80,031 80,031 80,031
Adj. R-squared 0.160 0.164 0.160 0.164
Panel D. Change in transient vs. change in non-transient investors
IV∆Tmi1 Tran -2.140*** -1.910***
[-3.92] [-3.65]
IV∆Tmi1 NonTran -1.421*** -1.298***
[-3.57] [-3.42]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 73,466 73,466 73,466 73,466
Adj. R-squared 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.020











Table A6. Alternative measures of motivated monitoring institutional owner-
ship
This table presents the 2SLS regression results of inefficient investment on alternative
measures of motivated monitoring institutional ownership: Pmi1 the proportion of moti-
vated monitoring institutional investors in a firm’s institutional investors, Ln(1+Nmi1)
the natural log of one plus the motivated institutional investor number (Nmi1), and
TMA calculated by Equation (4). The 2SLS regression model is the same as those
reported in Panel A of Table A4. We omit the estimated regression coefficients in the
first step regression for brevity. In Panel A–C, the independent variable of interest in
the second stage regressions is IV Pmi1, IV Ln(1 +Nmi1), and IV TMA, the predicted
values by the first stage regressions. We suppress the estimated coefficients of all control
variables for brevity. Detailed definitions of all variables are described in Appendix A.
Fama–French 48 industry and year fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. The
standard errors are clustered by firm. t-values are reported in brackets. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Inef1 Und1 Ovr1 Inef2 Und2 Ovr2
Panel A. Pmi1
IV Pmi1 -0.265*** -0.145*** -0.392*** -0.288*** -0.172*** -0.382***
[-3.41] [-2.84] [-2.63] [-3.87] [-3.33] [-2.62]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 80,031 45,018 35,013 80,031 45,018 35,013
Adj. R-squared 0.160 0.246 0.184 0.164 0.238 0.192
Panel B. Ln(1+Nmi1)
IV Ln(1 +Nmi1) -0.011*** -0.006*** -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.015***
[-4.11] [-3.33] [-3.04] [-4.49] [-3.54] [-3.03]
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 80,031 45,018 35,013 80,031 45,018 35,013
Adj. R-squared 0.160 0.246 0.184 0.164 0.238 0.192
Panel C. TMA
IV TMA -0.002** -0.006*** -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.005***
[-2.57] [-8.88] [-2.03] [-5.05] [-2.34] [-7.62]
Continued on next page











Table A6 - continued from previous page
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Inef1 Und1 Ovr1 Inef2 Und2 Ovr2
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry & year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 80,031 45,018 35,013 80,031 35,013 45,018
Adj. R-squared 0.160 0.248 0.184 0.165 0.192 0.239











Table A7. How do motivated monitoring institutional investors mitigate firm
over-investment?
This table presents the second stage regressions of firm over-investment on the product
of the predicted motivated monitoring institutional ownership and firm cash. The first
stage regression is the same as the one reported in Panel A of Table A4. In Columns
(1) and (3), the dependent variables are the firm over-investment proxy variable Ovr1,
estimated by the historical panel regressions. In Columns (2) and (4), the dependent
variables are the firm over-investment proxy variable Ovr2, estimated by the single panel
regression. The independent variables of interest in the second stage regressions are the
product of the predicted Tmi1 by the first stage regressions and Cash (IV Tmi1∗Cash)
in Columns (1)–(2) and the product of the predicted Tmi1 by the first stage regressions
and FCF (IV Tmi1∗FCF ) in Columns (3)–(4). FCF1 (FCF2) is estimated by Equation
(6) with the historical panel regressions (the single panel regression). Detailed definitions
of all variables are described in Appendix A. Fama–French 48 industry and year fixed
effects are controlled for in all regressions. The standard errors are clustered by firm.
t-values are reported in brackets. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Ovr1 Ovr2 Ovr1 Ovr2
IV Tmi1 -0.106** -0.106** -0.128* -0.132*
[-2.02] [-2.07] [-1.86] [-1.82]
IV Tmi1 ∗ Cash -0.130*** -0.120***
[-3.80] [-3.58]








Cash 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.013** 0.011*
[5.67] [5.90] [2.00] [1.73]
MTB 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.008***
[9.40] [9.07] [4.85] [4.57]
Leverage 0.016*** 0.007** 0.013*** 0.007
[4.62] [2.16] [3.22] [1.61]
Size -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.005*
[-3.05] [-2.84] [-1.98] [-1.82]
Tangibility 0.015*** 0.012** 0.022*** 0.016**
[2.66] [2.09] [3.16] [2.23]
Age -0.002** -0.009*** -0.003** -0.008***
[-2.09] [-8.69] [-2.14] [-6.32]
Constant 0.132*** 0.128*** 0.131*** 0.131***
[11.14] [11.31] [8.14] [7.97]
Observations 35,013 35,013 19,333 17,529
Adj. R-squared 0.185 0.192 0.134 0.144
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes











Table A8. How does motivated monitoring by institutional investors mitigate
firm under-investment?
This table presents the second stage regressions of firm under-investment on the prod-
uct of the predicted motivated institutional ownership and the variables proxy for firm
managers’ career concern. The first stage regression is the same as the one in Panel A of
Table A4. In Columns (1) and (3), the dependent variables are the firm under-investment
proxy variable Und1, estimated by the historical panel regressions. In Columns (2) and
(4), the dependent variables are the firm under-investment proxy variable Und2, esti-
mated by the panel regressions. In Columns (1) and (2), the independent variable of
interest is the product of the predicted Tmi1 by the first stage regressions and Compe-
tition (IV Tmi1 ∗ Competition). In Columns (3) and (4), the independent variable of
interest is the product of the predicted Tmi1 by the first stage regressions and G-index
(IV Tmi1 ∗GIndex). Detailed definitions of all variables are described in Appendix A.
Fama–French 48 industry and year fixed effects are controlled for in all regressions. The
standard errors are clustered by firm. t-values are reported in brackets. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Und1 Und2 Und1 Und2
IV Tmi1 -0.029 -0.033 -0.116** -0.119**
[-1.15] [-1.28] [-2.00] [-1.99]








MTB -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 0.001
[-2.83] [-2.17] [0.23] [0.64]
Leverage -0.032*** -0.027*** -0.029*** -0.015***
[-23.57] [-18.32] [-7.51] [-3.68]
Cash 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.007 0.006
[10.03] [7.70] [1.40] [1.20]
Size -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.008***
[-6.15] [-6.57] [-3.87] [-4.21]
Tangibility 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.021*** 0.023***
[4.06] [3.79] [2.66] [2.87]
Age -0.001** 0.006*** -0.007*** 0.003***
[-2.52] [13.55] [-7.55] [3.46]
Constant 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.136*** 0.141***
[6.39] [6.90] [10.97] [11.53]
Observations 47,445 47,445 3,082 3,082
R-squared 0.198 0.181 0.251 0.265
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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